Your points around the Barnum effect seem to closely mirror things we regularly see on SEND Pupil Passports and the like. How can we avoid this pitfall, when these are regularly written by low-paid teaching assistants, who may have neither the time, the inclination or the capacity to tailor them further? I fully agree that they're meaningless, FWIW.
Do charisma, humour and colour automatically prelude rigour? I've always found this idea a bit daft. If one is rigorous about the presentation of one's alleged charisma, if one is pointed and determined in rigorous use of humour, if one displays student work as exemplars of what we're going for, isn't it more than likely we'll also be rigorous about content? A very good piece of wiring, as ever, I may even read the original paper.
A common behavioural issue is students being rude. It's possible to be rude without having to swear or roll your eyes - one can merely have a dismissive or passive-aggressive response.
If things like statements like "being rude" are too subjective, how would you record situations where the student is being passive-aggressive or dismissive?
I think it helps to actively teach the behaviour you want and expect. This is why something like SLANT can be useful. If students are being dismissive or disrespectful then we can call them on it. I tend to find this sort of behaviour is rooted in the culture of the classroom or school. If I'm respectful and if my teaching makes students feel successful, then it's easier to change the culture but, ultimately, there have to be consequences. Rudeness - in whatever guise - won't be tolerated in the adult word so it's important that we provide a safe microcosm for children to learn what's expected where the consequences are pretty mild but nonetheless there. Certainty is far not important than severity when it comes to these consequences. Does that help?
Thank you - I appreciate the response and the sincere desire to help. However, I was not asking for a solution to poor behaviour but to use it as a counter-example to a point made in your article. I think the gist of my statement might have been missed so I'll rephrase; I was responding to this passage:
"Behaviour records often blur the line between fact and interpretation, mixing concrete incidents with subjective judgments like “defiant tone” or “poor attitude.” " . . . "These patterns persist not because teachers lack skill or care, but because the system often lacks the structures needed to distinguish appearance from evidence."
My point was that the some difficult behaviours are intentionally ambiguous, such as passive-aggression. As a consequence, having vaguer descriptive language helps capture what should be dealt with. The difficulty with being more precise is that the increase in detail can offer more value to record-keepers than to pastoral care.
My comment was not to elicit a solution but to note this problem with respect to behaviour records. And to pose the question of how you would record such behaviour so that something like passive-aggression or dismissive behaviour can be distinguished from the mere appearance of such, when such behaviour are rooted in appearances.
Ah, apologies. So, if I’m understanding correctly, the question is whether vagueness has a purpose and whether that purpose can be ‘good’? Obviously, ambiguity exists because it’s useful not to have say exactly what we mean. Mozzarella, Roquefort and cheddar are all cheese but all different. It’s efficient to say, ‘I like cheese’ and precise to say, ‘I prefer cheddar’. The existence of the passive voice in English is a testament to the utility of ambiguity: if I say, ‘mistakes were made’ I don’t have to take responsibility. I think what your question might boil down to is 1) what’s the intention behind being vague and 2) is our experience of vagueness and opportunity - intended or otherwise - for us to insert our beliefs and preferences as to causation. In your example, ‘rudeness’ is a category (like cheese) which is sufficiently meaningful for the purpose and unlikely to result in others saying, ‘ah well, that’s because of [thing I don’t like].
Thanks David, I've been wondering how to apply this principle of falsifiability to Geary's Biological primary/secondary, and the part in CLT that says Explicit teaching should be used for novices.
Well, the biologically primary/secondary thing of course isn’t falsifiable but then it’s just a model. The novice/expert thing has been falsified, hasn’t it? The claim is the result of evidence, or have I missed something?
I initially thought Geary’s work was a theory. The research on productive failure seems to challenge aspects of Cognitive Load Theory (CLT). Sweller is attempting to reconcile these contradictions by introducing additional variables, such as element interactivity and the novice-expert distinction.
In his recent study—Sweller & Zhang (2024)—they acknowledge that “The inconsistency in these findings is stark.” Their results were inconclusive, as the pre-test used to differentiate novices from experts showed that 50% of novices struggled with explicit instruction, while others performed reasonably well with productive failure.
My concern is that by incorporating more variables, the theory risks becoming unfalsifiable—making it difficult to systematically test or refute its claims.
Found it: Zhang L; Sweller J, 2024, 'Instructional sequences in science teaching: considering element interactivity when sequencing inquiry-based investigation activities and explicit instruction', European Journal of Psychology of Education, 39, pp. 3791 - 3801, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10212-024-00799-5
I think Fig 2 on low expertise students is interesting, the paper does not provide much discussion about this, but looking at the results there should be some explanation for the nearly 50% of the Explicit group who got poor results in the post test.
David writes: "To borrow from Popper, 'A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.' That principle - falsifiability - holds that a claim must be open to disproof through evidence if it is to count as serious knowledge. If no possible observation could show a judgment to be wrong, then it is not a meaningful claim, it is an opinion dressed as insight."
I've found this to be a clever argument that puts an end to the Materialist (Physicalist) view, the view that consciousness is an emergent property of a material substrate. The Materialistic claim -that first there was material (substance) and then, later, consciousness emerged-is not open to Popper's test. I'll explain...
The only way we make a scientific observation is through our conscious awareness: we engage in conscious observation. Consciousness is the foundation of all scientific observation. It is the baseline of falsifiability. Thus, with regard to the prior emergence of consciousness there is no observation, there is no science. There can be no meaningful claim, there can only be "opinion dressed as an insight."
The only model that can be verified is one in which we begin with a substrate of consciousness and later matter, substance, form emerges-from consciousness or Mind. This model lends itself to Popper's test. There is consciousness and thus the possibility of conscious observation (science) exists from the beginning. There is awareness and then... "there was light" or "let there be light" in the case of intentional consciousness. Thus, only Idealism meets Popper's test.
Your points around the Barnum effect seem to closely mirror things we regularly see on SEND Pupil Passports and the like. How can we avoid this pitfall, when these are regularly written by low-paid teaching assistants, who may have neither the time, the inclination or the capacity to tailor them further? I fully agree that they're meaningless, FWIW.
Do charisma, humour and colour automatically prelude rigour? I've always found this idea a bit daft. If one is rigorous about the presentation of one's alleged charisma, if one is pointed and determined in rigorous use of humour, if one displays student work as exemplars of what we're going for, isn't it more than likely we'll also be rigorous about content? A very good piece of wiring, as ever, I may even read the original paper.
A common behavioural issue is students being rude. It's possible to be rude without having to swear or roll your eyes - one can merely have a dismissive or passive-aggressive response.
If things like statements like "being rude" are too subjective, how would you record situations where the student is being passive-aggressive or dismissive?
I think it helps to actively teach the behaviour you want and expect. This is why something like SLANT can be useful. If students are being dismissive or disrespectful then we can call them on it. I tend to find this sort of behaviour is rooted in the culture of the classroom or school. If I'm respectful and if my teaching makes students feel successful, then it's easier to change the culture but, ultimately, there have to be consequences. Rudeness - in whatever guise - won't be tolerated in the adult word so it's important that we provide a safe microcosm for children to learn what's expected where the consequences are pretty mild but nonetheless there. Certainty is far not important than severity when it comes to these consequences. Does that help?
Thank you - I appreciate the response and the sincere desire to help. However, I was not asking for a solution to poor behaviour but to use it as a counter-example to a point made in your article. I think the gist of my statement might have been missed so I'll rephrase; I was responding to this passage:
"Behaviour records often blur the line between fact and interpretation, mixing concrete incidents with subjective judgments like “defiant tone” or “poor attitude.” " . . . "These patterns persist not because teachers lack skill or care, but because the system often lacks the structures needed to distinguish appearance from evidence."
My point was that the some difficult behaviours are intentionally ambiguous, such as passive-aggression. As a consequence, having vaguer descriptive language helps capture what should be dealt with. The difficulty with being more precise is that the increase in detail can offer more value to record-keepers than to pastoral care.
My comment was not to elicit a solution but to note this problem with respect to behaviour records. And to pose the question of how you would record such behaviour so that something like passive-aggression or dismissive behaviour can be distinguished from the mere appearance of such, when such behaviour are rooted in appearances.
Ah, apologies. So, if I’m understanding correctly, the question is whether vagueness has a purpose and whether that purpose can be ‘good’? Obviously, ambiguity exists because it’s useful not to have say exactly what we mean. Mozzarella, Roquefort and cheddar are all cheese but all different. It’s efficient to say, ‘I like cheese’ and precise to say, ‘I prefer cheddar’. The existence of the passive voice in English is a testament to the utility of ambiguity: if I say, ‘mistakes were made’ I don’t have to take responsibility. I think what your question might boil down to is 1) what’s the intention behind being vague and 2) is our experience of vagueness and opportunity - intended or otherwise - for us to insert our beliefs and preferences as to causation. In your example, ‘rudeness’ is a category (like cheese) which is sufficiently meaningful for the purpose and unlikely to result in others saying, ‘ah well, that’s because of [thing I don’t like].
Is that a better response?
Thanks David, I've been wondering how to apply this principle of falsifiability to Geary's Biological primary/secondary, and the part in CLT that says Explicit teaching should be used for novices.
Well, the biologically primary/secondary thing of course isn’t falsifiable but then it’s just a model. The novice/expert thing has been falsified, hasn’t it? The claim is the result of evidence, or have I missed something?
I initially thought Geary’s work was a theory. The research on productive failure seems to challenge aspects of Cognitive Load Theory (CLT). Sweller is attempting to reconcile these contradictions by introducing additional variables, such as element interactivity and the novice-expert distinction.
In his recent study—Sweller & Zhang (2024)—they acknowledge that “The inconsistency in these findings is stark.” Their results were inconclusive, as the pre-test used to differentiate novices from experts showed that 50% of novices struggled with explicit instruction, while others performed reasonably well with productive failure.
My concern is that by incorporating more variables, the theory risks becoming unfalsifiable—making it difficult to systematically test or refute its claims.
Oh really? I haven’t looked at that yet. Thanks for the pointer. Is it this one? https://www.researchgate.net/publication/377185079_Correction_to_There_is_an_Evidence_Crisis_in_Science_Educational_Policy
Found it: Zhang L; Sweller J, 2024, 'Instructional sequences in science teaching: considering element interactivity when sequencing inquiry-based investigation activities and explicit instruction', European Journal of Psychology of Education, 39, pp. 3791 - 3801, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10212-024-00799-5
I think Fig 2 on low expertise students is interesting, the paper does not provide much discussion about this, but looking at the results there should be some explanation for the nearly 50% of the Explicit group who got poor results in the post test.
David writes: "To borrow from Popper, 'A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.' That principle - falsifiability - holds that a claim must be open to disproof through evidence if it is to count as serious knowledge. If no possible observation could show a judgment to be wrong, then it is not a meaningful claim, it is an opinion dressed as insight."
I've found this to be a clever argument that puts an end to the Materialist (Physicalist) view, the view that consciousness is an emergent property of a material substrate. The Materialistic claim -that first there was material (substance) and then, later, consciousness emerged-is not open to Popper's test. I'll explain...
The only way we make a scientific observation is through our conscious awareness: we engage in conscious observation. Consciousness is the foundation of all scientific observation. It is the baseline of falsifiability. Thus, with regard to the prior emergence of consciousness there is no observation, there is no science. There can be no meaningful claim, there can only be "opinion dressed as an insight."
The only model that can be verified is one in which we begin with a substrate of consciousness and later matter, substance, form emerges-from consciousness or Mind. This model lends itself to Popper's test. There is consciousness and thus the possibility of conscious observation (science) exists from the beginning. There is awareness and then... "there was light" or "let there be light" in the case of intentional consciousness. Thus, only Idealism meets Popper's test.